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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
On April 7, 2020, the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania ordered the immediate 
release of twenty-two immigration detainees (collectively, 
Petitioners) from the York County Prison (York) and Pike 
County Correctional Facility (Pike) amidst the COVID-192 
pandemic. It did so ex parte, by granting Petitioners’ motion 
for temporary restraining order (TRO) without affording the 
Government an opportunity to be heard. After staying its April 
7, 2020 order, the District Court again mandated Petitioners’ 
release on April 10, 2020. The Government appealed both 
orders. As we explained in Hope v. Warden York County 
Prison, 956 F.3d 156, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2020) (Hope I), the 
District Court’s orders—which purported to be TROs—were 
in effect mandatory preliminary injunctions. Having 
determined in Hope I that we have jurisdiction, we now 
consider the merits of the Government’s appeal. 
I 
This case followed closely on the heels of a similar one 
decided by the District Court. See Thakker v. Doll, — F. Supp. 
3d —, 2020 WL 1671563 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020). In 
Thakker, immigration detainees sought release from their 
detention in York, Pike, and a third facility. The District Court 
held the detainees were likely to succeed on their claim that 
their detention deprived them of substantive due process 
 
2 COVID-19 “is a highly contagious respiratory virus 
that poses unique risks in population-dense facilities.” Hope v. 
Warden York Cnty. Prison, 956 F.3d 156, 157 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2020) (Hope I) (quoting United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 
595–96 (3d Cir. 2020)). 
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because of their advanced ages and medical histories. Id. at *9. 
So it ordered their release. 
Three days after the District Court issued its order in 
Thakker, Petitioners filed their “Verified Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Emergency Injunctive 
Relief” seeking release from custody and alleging they were at 
risk of serious harm from COVID-19 while detained at York 
and Pike. They filed a joint habeas petition even though they: 
(1) vary in age from 28 to 69, with only one of them older than 
65; (2) have divergent health conditions; (3) were detained for 
various reasons; (4) have unique criminal histories; (5) have 
individual flight risk profiles; and (6) have diverse home and 
family situations. Despite those distinguishing characteristics, 
the petition alleged they are “united by the fact that they are 
over age 65 and/or adults who have a serious pre-existing 
medical condition” and that “the United States Centers for 
Disease Control has determined [their conditions] put[] them 
at significantly higher risk of severe disease and death if they 
contract COVID-19.” App. 28. The petition further averred 
that conditions at York and Pike place Petitioners at higher risk 
to contract COVID-19 because “risk mitigation is impossible” 
there. App. 79. They claimed their confinement deprives them 
of substantive due process because it constitutes punishment 
and because Respondents are deliberately indifferent to their 
serious medical needs. According to Petitioners, only release 
will rectify their unconstitutional confinement. 
 Petitioners provided a general description of their health 
conditions and little detail about their immigration 
circumstances. The petition stated that some are lawful 
permanent residents, while others seek adjustment of status 
through an ill spouse or because they have lived in this country 
since they were children. The petition described the criminal 
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records and histories for very few of the Petitioners and did so 
summarily. Federal law required some to be detained while 
others were detained at the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security or an immigration judge. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c); and 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 
1236.1(c); see also Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 958–59 
(2019). 
 The petition was accompanied by a motion for TRO, but 
Petitioners did not request ex parte relief. In fact, they emailed 
their filings to counsel for the Government and asked the Court 
to “immediately schedule a hearing.” App. 86. Even though 
Petitioners’ counsel promptly (and appropriately) engaged 
opposing counsel in the adversary process, the District Court 
entered its April 7 order ex parte without a hearing, relying 
heavily on its prior findings and decision in Thakker.  
The April 7 order commanded the Government to 
immediately release Petitioners “on their own recognizance.” 
App. 14. It also required Petitioners to self-quarantine for 
fourteen days after their release. Id. The terms of the injunction 
were to expire on April 20, 2020 at 5:00 p.m. Id. Finally, the 
Court ordered the Government—from which it had not yet 
heard—to show cause “why the [order] should not be 
converted into a preliminary injunction.” Id. 
Less than five hours after the April 7 ex parte order was 
entered on the docket, the Government entered its appearance, 
filed a motion to stay the immediate release order, and sought 
reconsideration based on the declaration of Assistant Field 
Office Director Joseph Dunn. The District Court granted a 
temporary stay of its ex parte order and ordered Petitioners to 
respond to the motion for reconsideration, which they did on 
April 8. That same day, the Government responded to the 
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petition and motion for TRO. Also on April 8, the Court 
scheduled a status conference for April 9, which it apparently 
held off the record.  On April 10, the Government filed another 
declaration of Director Dunn. 
Later on April 10, and again without holding a hearing 
and without discussing the Government’s response in 
opposition to Petitioners’ filings, the District Court entered an 
order: (1) denying reconsideration of its April 7 order; (2) 
lifting the temporary stay; and (3) reiterating the relief 
provided by the April 7 order, again mandating the release of 
Petitioners that day. App. 20–21. Like the April 7 order, the 
April 10 order instructed Petitioners to self-quarantine for 
fourteen days after their release. App. 21.3 
The April 10 order purported to expire on April 20, 
2020, but contradicted itself in two ways. It extended the 
“release period . . . until such time as the COVID-19 state of 
emergency as declared by the Governor of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania is lifted, or by further Order of this Court.” Id. 
at 21. And it terminated the release period “immediately if a 
Petitioner absconds.” Id. 
 The April 10 order also imposed new conditions on 
both parties, stating:  
a. This Order requires Petitioners to comply 
with all Executive Orders . . . as well as 
national, state and local guidance 
 
3 The Government agreed to the release of Duc Viet 
Lam and Iwan Rajardja, so they were not included in the 
District Court’s second release order. 
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regarding staying at home, sheltering in 
place, and social distancing; 
b. This Order does not prevent the 
government from taking Petitioners back 
into custody should they commit any 
further crimes or otherwise violate the 
terms of their release; 
c. The Petitioners shall report their 
whereabouts once per week to their 
attorneys, who in turn shall report to the 
Respondents if a Petitioner has 
absconded; 
d. The Petitioners must appear at all 
hearings pertaining to their removal 
proceedings, and in the event that they are 
subject to a final order of deportation for 
which arrangements have been finalized 
within the period of this Order, they shall 
fully comply with the said order of 
deportation and all instructions pertaining 
thereto; and 
e. Respondents may impose other 
reasonable nonconfinement terms of 
supervision that would not require 
Petitioners to violate national, state and 
local guidance regarding staying at home, 
sheltering in place, and social distancing. 
App. 21–22 (emphases added). 
 The Government timely appealed the April 7 and April 
10 orders. 
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II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
Hope I, 956 F.3d at 159 n.5, 162.  
III 
We review the District Court’s orders under the 
standard of review for preliminary injunctions because they 
granted preliminary injunctive relief within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1). See Hope I, 956 F.3d at 162. Rule 65 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes preconditions on 
the issuance of injunctions, including TROs. For an injunction 
to issue:  
the plaintiffs had to demonstrate (1) that they are 
reasonably likely to prevail eventually in the 
litigation and (2) that they are likely to suffer 
irreparable injury without relief. If these two 
threshold showings are made the District Court 
then considers, to the extent relevant, (3) whether 
an injunction would harm the [defendants] more 
than denying relief would harm the plaintiffs and 
(4) whether granting relief would serve the 
public interest. 
K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 
105 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Because the Court granted a mandatory injunction, a 
heightened standard applies. Bennington Foods, LLC v. St. 
Croix Renaissance Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 
2008). So Petitioners bore a “particularly heavy” burden, 
Acierno v. New Castle Cnty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994), 
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requiring them to show a substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits and that their “right to relief [is] indisputably clear,” 
Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 
139 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Communist Party of Ind. v. 
Witcomb, 409 U.S. 1235, 1235 (1972)). 
We review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear 
error, its legal conclusions de novo, and its decision to grant 
injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. See K.A. ex rel. Ayers, 
710 F.3d at 105. An abuse of discretion exists when the 
decision rests “on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 
erroneous assessment of the evidence,” Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990), which includes an 
improper application of the correct law to the facts, United 
States v. Reyes-Romero, 959 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2020). Clear 
error exists “when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
IV 
 With the legal framework just described in mind, we 
begin with the Government’s procedural challenges. It 
contends the District Court erred by granting relief ex parte. 
The Government also claims the District Court erred when the 
Court absolved Petitioners of their duty to show entitlement to 
injunctive relief by ordering the Government to show cause 
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why the Petitioners were not entitled to a mandatory injunction 
and by applying reconsideration standards.  
A 
  “As the Supreme Court has observed, ‘our entire 
jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken 
before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has 
been granted [to] both sides of a dispute.’” Hope I, 956 F.3d at 
160 (quoting Granny Goose Foods Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 
415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974)). And the Court has described due 
process in this way:  
Parties whose rights are to be affected are 
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may 
enjoy that right they must first be notified. It is 
equally fundamental that the right to notice and 
an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted).  
Despite these principles, a TRO may be entered ex 
parte, but only if safeguards in Rule 65(b) are met. For 
example, Rule 65(b)(3) requires an expedited preliminary 
injunction hearing after an ex parte TRO is entered. And a 
court may not convert an ex parte TRO into a preliminary 
injunction without a hearing or issue an ex parte preliminary 
injunction. See Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 439 & n.14 (Rule 
65(b)’s stringent requirements restrict ex parte TRO’s to 
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“preserving the status quo” and “preventing irreparable harm” 
only for the time “necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer”). 
Although Petitioners stated their prayer for relief 
alternatively as a request for a TRO or for a preliminary 
injunction, they never sought ex parte relief and their counsel 
advised the Court that they promptly served the Government. 
Accordingly, Petitioners’ counsel did not include a Rule 
65(b)(1)(B) certification required for ex parte relief. The Court 
failed to explain why the order had to issue without affording 
the Government an opportunity to be heard, in violation of 
Rule 65(b)(2). And it did so even though Petitioners requested 
a hearing and counsel for Respondents were well known to the 
Court from their involvement in the Thakker case.4 All this was 
contrary to law. 
B 
The District Court’s initial failure to include the 
Government in the proceedings created problems downstream 
when it issued the April 10 order. Instead of acknowledging 
the Government’s substantive response to the petition and 
motion consistent with the prerequisites for issuing injunctive 
relief, the Court not only shifted the burden to the Government, 
but also required it to surmount the high hurdle applicable to a 
 
4 The Respondents in Thakker and Hope are identical 
except for one party (Clinton County). Each Respondent in 
Hope is represented by the same counsel from Thakker and the 
same attorney entered her appearance on behalf of the 
Respondent detention facilities involved in both actions. 
Compare Thakker v. Doll, M.D. Pa. Docket No. 1:20-cv-
00480, with Hope v. Doll, M.D. Pa. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00562.  
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motion for reconsideration. Hope I, 956 F.3d at 162. Petitioners 
counter that the Government invited the error by filing its 
reconsideration motion. We disagree.  
The District Court turned due process on its head when 
it required the party against whom it ordered injunctive relief 
to prove why such relief should not be continued. See Gonzales 
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 429 (2006) (“The point remains that the burdens at the 
preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial.”); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(3) (in expediting preliminary 
injunction hearing held after TRO issues “the party who 
obtained the order must proceed with the motion”). The burden 
to prove clear entitlement to injunctive relief always stays with 
the party requesting that relief. So the District Court erred 
when its April 10 order required the Government to show: (1) 
new evidence before it was ever afforded the chance to present 
any evidence before the April 7 order was issued; (2) a change 
in the law before it was allowed to brief the Court; and (3) the 
need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest 
injustice. App. 18 (citing Max’s Seafood Café by Lou Ann, Inc. 
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). For these 
reasons, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion 
when it applied reconsideration standards to issue the April 10 
order. 
C 
The April 10 order violates other provisions of Rule 65. 
It mandates Petitioners’ release until the Governor of 
Pennsylvania lifts the state of emergency or the Court orders 
otherwise, while purporting to expire on April 20, 2020. The 
contingent nature of the Governor’s state of emergency 
rendered the order indefinite contrary to the fourteen-day time 
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limit in Rule 65(b)(2). See Hope I, 956 F.3d at 162. And it also 
rendered the provision indeterminate in violation of the 
specification requirements of Rule 65(d).  
Rule 65(d) provides that “[e]very order granting an 
injunction and every restraining order must state its terms 
specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or 
acts restrained or required.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(B) & (C) 
(emphasis added). These requirements are not mere 
technicalities. They “relate[] to the court’s awesome civil and 
criminal contempt powers. Persons may not be placed at risk 
of contempt unless they have been given specific notice of the 
norm to which they must pattern their conduct.” Inmates of 
Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Wecht, 754 F.2d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(citations omitted). We recognize that temporary and 
preliminary injunctive relief orders issue in the context of 
“exigent circumstances and at times may lack the precision of 
final decrees.” Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 
F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). But “Rule 65(d) was designed to 
prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced 
with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a 
contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.” 
Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974). In short, a party 
must “receive fair and precisely drawn notice of what the 
injunction actually prohibits [or requires].” Granny Goose, 415 
U.S. at 444. 
Other terms of the District Court’s April 7 and 10 orders 
are too indefinite to satisfy Rule 65(d). Under that subsection, 
an injunction “should be phrased in terms of objective actions, 
not legal conclusions.” United States v. Askins & Miller 
Orthopaedics, P.A., 924 F.3d 1348, 1362 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The April 10 order 
permits the Government to impose “reasonable 
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nonconfinement terms of supervision.” App. 22. But 
“reasonable” is capacious enough to provoke disagreement 
between Petitioners and the Government regarding the 
propriety of any additional terms of supervision. The order also 
permits the Government to re-detain Petitioners if “they 
commit any further crimes” or “violate the terms of their 
release.” App. 21. That provision raises more questions than it 
answers, however. Do “further crimes” include traffic 
violations? We doubt that was the District Court’s intention. 
Perhaps the Court meant only felonies? But Petitioners could 
“violate the terms of their release” without committing any 
crime at all. So the April 10 order is not just vague, it is also 
over- and under-inclusive. The Government would be acting at 
its peril if it were to re-detain Petitioners. 
The April 7 and April 10 orders also require affirmative 
acts by Petitioners, subject to contempt and re-detention if they 
fail to comply. Both orders mandate self-quarantine without 
explaining what that entails. The April 10 order requires 
Petitioners “to comply with all . . . national, state and local 
guidance regarding staying at home, sheltering in place, and 
social distancing,” id., but does not specify what constitutes 
“guidance.” It also compels Petitioners to report their 
whereabouts to their counsel, who in turn are required to report 
absconsion. App. 21–22. Must counsel report only known 
absconsion? What about likely absconsion or a failure to report 
each week? The lack of specificity as to affirmative acts 
required by Petitioners and their counsel in the order also 
contravenes Rule 65(d). 
Finally, the District Court failed to order bond. Under 
Rule 65(c), the absence of a bond precludes issuance of an 
injunction. See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 
412, 426 (3d Cir. 2010) (court can excuse bond required for 
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injunction only on “specific finding” that “rare exception” 
applies). These violations of Rule 65 were legal error. 
V 
Procedural missteps often lead to substantive errors, and 
that is true in this case as well. The District Court abused its 
discretion when it held that Petitioners showed a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Before we 
address that issue, however, we must determine whether 
Petitioners properly brought their claims via petition for writ 
of habeas corpus. 
The parties dispute whether release sought on the basis 
of conditions of confinement is cognizable under the habeas 
statute. “Of course, the party who brings a suit is master to 
decide what law he will rely upon.” Fair v. Kohler Die & 
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). Petitioners brought an 
action seeking only the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, and they reiterate on appeal that they do not 
“seek[] to modify their conditions [of confinement]” and “the 
only relief sought by Petitioners—the only adequate relief for 
the constitutional claims—is release, which is unequivocally a 
habeas remedy.” Pet’rs’ Br. 50 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  
The Government contends that “[h]abeas [] is an 
improper vehicle . . . for detainees to challenge their conditions 
of confinement.” Gov’t’s Br. 29. If the Government is correct, 
Petitioners cannot show likelihood of success. The District 
Court held that Petitioners properly brought their petition for 
release as one seeking the writ of habeas corpus. We agree.  
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The traditional function of the writ of habeas corpus is 
to secure release from unlawful executive detention. Munaf v. 
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). Where a petitioner seeks 
release from detention, habeas (not a § 1983 action seeking 
release) is proper. Even where a complaint seeks both damages 
pursuant to § 1983 and habeas relief, the damages action 
should be stayed while habeas is exhausted. Tedford v. 
Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1993). 
The Government argues that under Leamer v. Fauver, 
288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002), Petitioners cannot challenge 
their conditions via habeas. Leamer was a prisoner who filed a 
§ 1983 action challenging prison restrictions that denied him 
required treatment. We determined that Leamer’s claim was 
properly brought under § 1983. Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542. Our 
discussion of challenges requiring resort to habeas and our 
holding that the use of § 1983 was appropriate in that case does 
not undermine the availability of habeas to Petitioners here, 
however.  
In addressing the nature of habeas and § 1983, we 
observed: 
Although both § 1983 and habeas corpus allow 
prisoners to challenge unconstitutional conduct 
by state officers, the two are not coextensive 
either in purpose or effect. Habeas relief is 
clearly quite limited: “The underlying purpose of 
proceedings under the ‘Great Writ’ of habeas 
corpus has traditionally been to ‘inquire into the 
legality of the detention, and the only judicial 
relief authorized was the discharge of the 
prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if 
his detention were found to be 
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unlawful.’” Powers of Congress and the Court 
Regarding the Availability and Scope of 
Review, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1551, 1553 
(2001) . . . . There is only a narrow subset of 
actions that arguably might properly be brought 
as either, that is, where the deprivation of rights 
is such that it necessarily impacts the fact or 
length of detention. In a series of decisions, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that for those 
cases, the narrower remedy, the habeas petition, 
is the only available avenue of relief.  
Leamer, 288 F.3d at 540. We expressly recognized that where 
the remedy sought was release from detention, the party was 
required to “proceed by way of habeas petition.” Id. at 540–41 
(citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)).  
As early as 1949, our Court recognized the potential for 
habeas as a means of challenging unconstitutional conditions 
of confinement. See Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 
1949) (en banc) (holding that habeas relief releasing petitioner 
was the appropriate remedy to avoid cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted in Georgia prisons), rev’d on other 
grounds, Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 684 (1949) (exhaustion 
required). And in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 
(1973), the Supreme Court recognized that a challenge to 
conditions of confinement rendering otherwise lawful custody 
unconstitutional arguably would lie in habeas. As recently as 
2017, the Supreme Court observed that this remains an open 
question, however. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862–63 
(2017).  
We have never held that a detainee cannot file a habeas 
petition to challenge conditions that render his continued 
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detention unconstitutional. Although the context of the vast 
majority of habeas cases involve challenges to criminal 
judgments, the language of the habeas statute justifies resort to 
the writ by non-prisoner detainees. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 
district courts may grant the writ, but their power to grant it is 
restricted. For example, the writ is unavailable to persons 
detained as enemy combatants. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e). This 
suggests that, where the exclusion in § 2241(e) does not apply, 
the writ is available to immigration detainees like Petitioners 
here, who are not challenging convictions or sentences. So the 
fact of Petitioners’ present confinement at York and Pike and 
the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement is a 
matter properly challenged by petition for the writ. Accord 
Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020). 
In recognizing the viability of this § 2241 claim we are 
not creating a garden variety cause of action. As the Supreme 
Court has instructed: “habeas corpus is an extraordinary 
remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by 
traditional rules of finality and federalism, its use has been 
limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional 
remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither 
severe nor immediate.” Hensley v. Mun. Court, San Jose 
Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). We 
acknowledged as much. See Ali v. Gibson, 572 F.2d 971 (3d 
Cir. 1978), superseded by statute on other grounds as 
recognized in Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 633 (3d Cir. 
2000). There, we noted that the petitioner, who had been 
convicted in the Virgin Islands of several counts of first-degree 
murder, assault, and robbery, and who was later incarcerated 
in Georgia, might not be able to assert a § 2241 claim. We 
observed that, at best, his claim rose “to a possible habeas 
attack on the conditions of confinement, cognizable in a federal 
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habeas action only in extreme cases.” Id. at 975 n.8. (emphasis 
added). Given the extraordinary circumstances that existed in 
March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are 
satisfied that their § 2241 claim seeking only release on the 
basis that unconstitutional confinement conditions require it is 
not improper.5 
For these reasons, we hold that Petitioners’ claim that 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at York and Pike 
require their release is cognizable in habeas.  
VI 
We turn now to likelihood of success on the merits. 
Petitioners claim their conditions of confinement violate the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. As immigration detainees, Petitioners are entitled 
to the same due process protections as pretrial detainees. E.D. 
v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2019). Petitioners 
are in federal custody pursuant to the INA and housed in state 
facilities, so they are protected by the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 210 (1982). Although the Eighth Amendment does 
not apply here, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986), 
the substantive due process guarantees afforded detainees like 
Petitioners are at least as robust as Eighth Amendment 
protections afforded prisoners, Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 
F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir. 1987). Applying this framework, we 
conclude the District Court abused its discretion when it held 
 
5 We do not address at this time whether a § 2241 
claim may be asserted in less serious circumstances. 
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that Petitioners showed a substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits of their claims. 
A 
Petitioners advanced their substantive due process 
claim under two separate but related theories: (1) because of 
their age and healthcare needs, the conditions at York and Pike 
subject them to punishment; and (2) the Government was 
deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs. The 
District Court determined Petitioners were likely to succeed 
under both theories. 
The Government contends Petitioners can proceed only 
under the deliberate indifference theory, citing to Sharkey, 928 
F.3d at 309. There are two problems with this argument. First, 
in Sharkey, we held the detainee plausibly stated a claim for 
unconstitutional punishment for an alleged sexual assault by a 
detention facility employee. Our discussion of deliberate 
indifference related to the detainee’s claim against Sharkey’s 
fellow employees and supervisor for their failure to protect the 
detainee against the known risk of serious harm. 928 F.3d at 
308. Second, we held long ago that substantive due process 
proscribes punishment of non-prisoners. See Hubbard v. 
Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005) (Hubbard I). So the 
District Court was correct to address both theories.  
B 
We first address Petitioners’ claim that their detention 
is unconstitutional punishment. In accordance with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549 
(1979), detainees may not be punished before they are 
adjudicated guilty. Hubbard v. Taylor (Hubbard II), 538 F.3d 
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229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). Petitioners asserted—and the District 
Court found—that, if Petitioners are exposed to COVID-19 and 
if they contract the virus, their ages and medical conditions put 
them at “imminent risk” of serious illness, including possible 
death. App. 2, 9, 39–40 & nn. 2–3; Supp. App. 7. The District 
Court articulated its findings as to the conditions of each 
Petitioner that subjected the Petitioner to increased risk if they 
contracted COVID-19. These individual findings are not clear 
error. Nevertheless, the District Court erred in holding that 
because age and medical conditions put them at increased risk 
if they contracted the virus, Petitioners were likely to show the 
Government subjected them to punishment.  
The touchstone for the constitutionality of detention is 
whether conditions of confinement are meant to punish or are 
“but an incident of some other legitimate governmental 
purpose.” Hubbard II, 538 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. 
at 538). “[T]he ultimate question” is whether conditions are 
“reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” 
Id. at 236 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 549). If Petitioners are 
subject to conditions unrelated to a legitimate governmental 
objective, “we may infer ‘that the purpose of the governmental 
action is punishment that may not be constitutionally inflicted 
upon detainees qua detainees.’” Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 307 
(quoting Hubbard II, 538 F.3d at 232). Hubbard I further 
instructs that we consider the totality of the circumstances of 
confinement, including any genuine privations or hardship 
over an extended period of time, and whether conditions are 
(1) rationally related to their legitimate purpose or 
(2) excessive in relation to that purpose. Hubbard I, 399 F.3d 
at 159–160; see, e.g., Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 
713 F.2d 984, 995–96 (3d Cir. 1983) (though double-bunking 
involved cramped, crowded cells for sleeping, it was not 
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punishment because it eliminated floor mattresses and 
permitted more recreational space).  
In assessing whether conditions and restrictions are 
excessive given their purposes, the courts must acknowledge 
that practical considerations of detention justify limitations on 
“many privileges and rights.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 545–46. 
Though not a convicted prisoner, a detainee “simply does not 
possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated 
individual.” Id. at 546. Thus, “[t]he fact of confinement as well 
as the legitimate goals and policies of the [] institution limits 
[Petitioners’] retained constitutional rights.” Id. 
Important here—and largely ignored by the District 
Court and Petitioners—are the legitimate objectives and 
difficulties of managing a detention facility, Hubbard II, 538 
F.3d at 233, and the objectives of immigration detention: 
ensuring appearance at detention proceedings and protecting 
the public from harm. See DiBuono, 713 F.2d at 993; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c). 
As the Supreme Court cautioned in Bell v. Wolfish: 
In determining whether restrictions or conditions 
are reasonably related to the Government’s 
interest in maintaining security and order and 
operating the institution in a manageable fashion, 
courts must heed our warning that such 
considerations are peculiarly within the province 
and professional expertise of corrections 
officials, and, in the absence of substantial 
evidence in the record to indicate that the 
officials have exaggerated their response to these 
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considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to 
their expert judgment in such matters. 
441 U.S. at 540 n.23 (citations omitted); see also Block v. 
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984) (noting the “very limited 
role that courts should play in the administration of detention 
facilities”). We defer to administrators on matters of 
correctional facility administration “not merely because the 
administrator ordinarily will . . . have a better grasp of his 
domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the 
operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the 
province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our 
Government not the Judicial.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 520.  
The District Court could see “no rational relationship 
between a legitimate government objective and keeping 
Petitioners detained in unsanitary, tightly-packed 
environments—[because] doing so would constitute a 
punishment to Petitioners.” App. 10 (quoting Thakker, 2020 
WL 1671563, at *8). But Petitioners’ confinement implicates 
multiple legitimate governmental objectives, including: (1) 
ensuring Petitioners’ appearances at removal proceedings; (2) 
protecting the public; and (3) managing the detention facilities. 
The District Court erred when it failed to consider these 
legitimate objectives. 
As to the conclusion that conditions at York and Pike 
were “unsanitary,” the District Court relied on evidence from 
a prior case and ignored the Government’s improvements at 
the facilities. In its April 7 decision, the Court made the 
following findings as to conditions at York and Pike based on 
its findings in Thakker and after considering only Petitioners’ 
filings: 
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• four Pike detainees (other than Petitioners) 
and four Pike employees tested positive for 
COVID-19; 
• one York detainee tested positive; 
• staff leave the facilities and return but do not 
reliably wear gloves and masks when 
interacting with inmates; 
• temperature checks, even as to those thought 
to be exposed to the virus, were infrequent;  
• cell blocks housing individuals testing 
positive are not thoroughly evacuated and 
cleaned; and  
• symptomatic inmates remain in general 
housing for days, and even once 
quarantined, others exposed to them were 
not tested.  
App. 7–8, 10. The Court observed (before the Government 
could respond) that it saw no indication from Petitioners’ 
filings that conditions had improved since its decision in 
Thakker because people tested positive at both York and Pike, 
and it “assumed” positive COVID-19 cases must be much 
higher. App. 7.  
Then, in its April 10 decision, when the Court 
considered only the Government’s reconsideration motion, it 
made just one additional comment we construe as a “finding” 
as to conditions: “[w]hile [the facilities] may have ramped up 
their sanitation protocols, the simple fact that inmates are 
incapable of social distancing in the facilities remains.” App. 
20. The Petition and supporting declarations described as 
“ideal” the social distancing parameter of six feet. The Court 
made that “ideal” a sine qua non of constitutional detention for 
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individuals at higher risk of serious harm if they contract 
COVID-19. In doing so, the Court was not “mindful that these 
inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that 
judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a 
court’s idea of how best to operate a detention facility.” Bell, 
441 U.S. at 539.  
Even more fundamentally, the District Court never 
addressed the Government’s substantive response to the 
petition and motion for TRO. Nor did it meaningfully consider 
pertinent evidence on conditions provided by the Government, 
including social distancing efforts at York and Pike. According 
to the Government’s filings, in the wake of COVID-19, it is 
complying with guidance from the CDC and epidemiologists 
from ICE Health Services Corps., and both York and Pike were 
operating at approximately 60 percent capacity (York can hold 
2,245 inmates but had 1,341; Pike can hold 375 but had 221). 
Upon admission, detainees were screened for disabilities and 
conditions, as well as for fever, respiratory illness, exposure to 
an area with many COVID-19 cases, and known contact with 
someone who tested positive within the previous two weeks. If 
there had been such contact, any exposed detainees would be 
placed in a cohort for 14 days with daily monitoring for 
symptoms. If a detainee presented with COVID-19 symptoms, 
he or she was isolated and tested. Detainees who began to show 
any COVID-19 symptoms were isolated, as were their 
cellmates. Those testing positive were placed in medical 
isolation and quarantined. In addition, York and Pike provided: 
masks to detainees; hand sanitizer and hygiene education to 
staff; and soap, water, and hard surface disinfectant to every 
housing unit. Both facilities encouraged staff to use sanitizer, 
soap, water, and disinfectant often and liberally. They 
encouraged staff to clean high traffic and high contact areas 
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multiple times throughout the day and medical staff were on-
site around the clock with the ability to admit patients to the 
local hospital. York and Pike also administered temperature 
checks to staff and vendors and suspended tours and visitation. 
Professional visits were contactless. Finally, all staff, 
contractors, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations 
personnel, and medical staff wore N95 masks; kitchen staff 
wore surgical masks; and isolated detainees wore N95 masks 
when they left their cohort housing unit. At Pike, movement 
was staggered and meals were served in cells. All of these 
efforts were material to the District Court’s assessment of the 
conditions challenged as punishment, yet it addressed none of 
them. 
Bell requires us to consider whether the Government 
imposed the challenged conditions for the express purpose of 
punishment, and if not, whether they are rationally connected 
to a legitimate purpose but excessive in relation to its purpose. 
441 U.S. at 538.  
[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial 
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate 
governmental objective, it does not, without 
more, amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a 
restriction or condition is not reasonably related 
to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or 
purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that 
the purpose of the governmental action is 
punishment that may not constitutionally be 
inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. 
Id. at 539. 
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Petitioners do not argue the Government subjected them 
to any conditions at York and Pike intended to harm them. 
Instead, they contend broadly the Government has no 
legitimate interest in detaining them in violation of their 
constitutional rights. But that truism sheds no light on the 
merits of their claims. Nor did the District Court’s 
determination that the Government has no legitimate interest 
in detaining Petitioners in “unsanitary, tightly-packed 
environments.” App. 10. In so concluding, the Court ignored 
legitimate governmental objectives and did not assess the 
conditions at York and Pike as of April 10.  
We also reject—as contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent and federal statute—the District Court’s view that, 
because the Government has means other than detention to 
effectuate the INA’s provisions for exclusion or expulsion of 
aliens, Petitioners’ civil detention cannot be rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpose. Detention of aliens 
pending their removal in accordance with the INA is 
constitutional and is supported by legitimate governmental 
objectives. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896). In fact, 
Congress has deemed the detention of criminal aliens so 
important that it is required by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
These congressional objectives held constitutional by the 
Supreme Court—detention of aliens in removal proceedings 
and mandatory detention of criminal aliens—render unsound 
the District Court’s conclusion that civil detention of aliens in 
removal proceedings is tantamount to punishment. See Nielsen, 
139 S. Ct. at 959 (quoting § 1226(a)) (Congress, through 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(a), “empowers the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to arrest and hold an alien ‘pending a decision on 
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.’”); 
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see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (mandatory detention for those 
convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, controlled substances 
offenses, and terrorism offenses); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) 
(mandatory detention for certain aliens ordered removed); 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (detention beyond removal period for 
aliens ordered removed and determined a risk to the public or 
not likely to comply with the order). 
Considering all the responsive measures specifically 
implemented to detect and to prevent spread of the virus, the 
challenges of facility administration during an unprecedented 
situation, and the purposes served by detention—Petitioners 
did not show a substantial likelihood of success on their claim 
that the conditions of their confinement constitute 
unconstitutional punishment. We therefore hold the District 
Court erred as to its punishment determination.  
C 
Petitioners argue in the alternative that the Government 
deprived them of substantive due process when it acted with 
deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (i.e., their 
vulnerability to COVID-19 because of their ages and medical 
conditions). See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34–35 
(1993) (recognizing claim of deliberate indifference of 
officials to exposure to tobacco smoke that poses unreasonable 
health risk); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 224 (3d Cir. 
2017) (particular vulnerability to suicide due to mental health 
conditions); Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (particular vulnerability 
due to insulin dependent diabetes). To establish deliberate 
indifference, Petitioners must show the Government knew of 
and disregarded an excessive risk to their health and safety. 
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).  
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Our decision in Palakovic—which involved a pretrial 
detainee’s “particular vulnerability”—is relevant here. 854 
F.3d at 218. There we addressed allegations that officials 
showed deliberate indifference toward a detainee’s exposure to 
a substantial risk of serious damage to his future health—that 
his particular vulnerability to suicide combined with detention 
conditions created a substantial risk of suicide and attempted 
suicide. Id. at 226. We recognized even if detention officials 
afford some care to the detainee, it still might not satisfy the 
Constitution’s demands in every situation. Id. at 228. But 
“mere disagreement” as to the response to the risk to 
Petitioners in light of their medical condition will not support 
constitutional infringement. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. 
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Deliberate indifference requires significantly more than 
negligence. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 
849–50 (1998). Indeed, deliberate indifference “is a ‘subjective 
standard of liability consistent with recklessness as that term is 
defined in the criminal law.’” Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (quoting 
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 811).  
The context of the Government’s conduct is essential to 
determine whether it shows the requisite deliberate 
indifference that “shocks the conscience” for a substantive due 
process violation. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. Just as we afford 
leeway to prison medical officials in diagnosing and treating a 
detainee’s physical and mental health, deference is due prison 
administrators here. The Supreme Court cautioned in Lewis: 
Rules of due process are not . . . subject to 
mechanical application in unfamiliar territory. 
Deliberate indifference that shocks in one 
environment may not be so patently egregious in 
another, and our concern with preserving the 
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constitutional proportions of substantive due 
process demands an exact analysis of 
circumstances before any abuse of power is 
condemned as conscience shocking.  
523 U.S. at 850 (emphasis added). 
 The District Court correctly observed that COVID-19 
presents “highly unusual and unique circumstances,” App. 12, 
that have “radically transformed our everyday lives in ways 
previously inconceivable,” App. 6, and have “altered [our 
world] with lightning speed . . . and unprecedented [results.]” 
App. 13. So we must evaluate the Government’s response to 
the virus in that context. But the Court’s orders do not indicate 
any serious consideration of the Government’s recent efforts at 
York and Pike, save for a passing reference in the April 10 
order that the Government had “ramped up [] sanitation 
protocols.” App. 20. 
In this context, Petitioners urge that because the virus 
has no vaccine or cure, exposure to it is per se unconstitutional. 
They also claim “[s]ocial distancing and proper hygiene” are 
the only “effective means” to prevent Petitioners from 
contracting the virus in detention, and “[p]reventative 
measures remain impossible at [York and Pike].” App. 106. In 
essence, they argue that the Government must eliminate 
entirely their risk of contracting COVID-19. That task is not 
the constitutional standard, however. Although the District 
Court criticized the Government for the lack of “effective 
containment measures,” and for not doing “nearly enough” to 
combat COVID-19, App. 7–9, those critiques are not 
tantamount to establishing the Government’s deliberate 
indifference.  
33 
 
Nor does a failure to eliminate all risk establish that the 
Government was deliberately indifferent to their serious 
medical needs. Recognizing challenges inherent in the 
detention setting, CDC guidance suggests placing detainees 
into cohorts where social distancing is not practical. CDC, 
Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities, 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-
detention.html (explaining that social-distancing strategies 
“will need to be tailored to the individual space in the facility 
and the needs of the population and staff” and that “[n]ot all 
strategies will be feasible in all facilities”). The petition and 
supporting declarations rely on CDC literature and 
recommendations. And the District Court relies heavily on its 
decision in Thakker, which in turn relies on CDC guidance for 
support. Yet the Court said nothing about CDC guidance 
specific to detention facilities. 
The record shows that the Government increased its 
efforts to minimize risk by improving hygiene and decreasing 
exposure even as information on the virus changed. But the 
Court undertook no analysis of those efforts. Instead, the Court 
summarily concluded that the efforts were not enough. The 
Court made no specific findings regarding how each Petitioner 
was housed. Instead, it determined “that inmates are incapable 
of social distancing in the facilities.” App. 20. 
In sum, we hold that Petitioners fell well short of 
establishing that the Government was deliberately indifferent 
toward their medical needs. Considering the record as a whole, 
we have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. Petitioners did not show a likelihood of success, 
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much less a strong likelihood of success, that their substantive 
due process rights were violated by either punishment or 
deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. 
VII 
In addition to its errors regarding Petitioners’ likelihood 
of success on the merits, the District Court erred in evaluating 
irreparable harm to Petitioners in the absence of relief, 
balancing the harms to each side, considering the public 
interest, and fashioning an “all-or-nothing” remedy. 
A 
Assuming Petitioners could succeed in showing 
likelihood of success, before balancing the harms and 
considering the public interest, the District Court was required 
to find that each Petitioner showed they would suffer 
irreparable injury absent relief. See Reilly v. City of 
Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). 
After finding Petitioners are “all at heightened risk for 
severe complications from COVID-19,” the District Court 
found they faced irreparable harm “should they contract” the 
virus. App. 9. This circular reasoning does not support relief 
because it applies regardless whether Petitioners are detained 
or released. 
Moreover, in assessing irreparable harm, the Court 
should have considered several factors for each individual 
(beyond just their ages and medical conditions) because “the 
personal nature of constitutional rights” is a “cardinal 
principle[] of our constitutional order,” New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). Yet a fundamental problem pervades 
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the District Court’s analysis: it treated Petitioners as a unit 
instead of as individuals with their own unique medical 
histories, medical risks, healthcare access needs, detention 
conditions, and release circumstances. It should have assessed 
all of these factors for each Petitioner to determine whether 
they would suffer more harm in detention than if released. 
For example, the District Court did not consider the 
particular confinement conditions of each Petitioner at York 
and Pike. Nor did it compare the conditions of the particular 
communities to which each Petitioner would be released. 
Questions abound on this point. How prevalent was the virus 
in their home communities? Would they live in close quarters 
with many family members or others? Were their families or 
roommates exposed to the virus or at risk of exposure? How 
would their access to healthcare at home compare to that 
provided at York and Pike? In other words, were they more 
likely to contract the virus than if they remained detained? In 
sum, the District Court’s failure to make a particularized 
inquiry and individualized findings as to the comparative risk 
faced by each Petitioner inside and outside of detention was 
error.  
B 
The District Court’s failure to make particularized 
findings also pervaded its balancing of harms, which likewise 
was error. The comparison of harm to the Government as 
opposed to the harm to Petitioners turns mostly on matters of 
public interest because these considerations “merge when the 
Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 
418, 435 (2009). And the District Court’s consideration of risk 
to the public’s safety before providing preliminary injunctive 
relief is crucial. Yet the District Court did not address risk of 
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harm to the public in terms of the Petitioners’ individual 
criminal history and risk of flight nor did it adequately consider 
associated burdens on public healthcare by each Petitioner’s 
release. 
The District Court said it “cannot find, in the face of the 
scope of the COVID-19 pandemic that is washing through this 
country and the subject facilities, that the public interest favors 
continued detention of civil immigration detainees with 
underlying health conditions that render them particularly 
vulnerable were they to contract COVID-19.” App. 19–20. 
This analysis of the public interest suffers from the same flaw 
we addressed in Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals 
Corp., 614 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1980), where the public interest 
“was expressed only in general and abstract terms.” Id. at 357. 
By merely acknowledging that the public’s interest is not 
served by the Government violating constitutional rights, the 
District Court rendered the public interest “no more than a 
makeweight for the court’s consideration of the moving party’s 
probability of eventual success on the merits.” Id. at 358. The 
Court thereby improperly eliminated the public interest from 
the required showing for preliminary injunctive relief. 
Although the District Court ordered Petitioners to self-
quarantine, it neither specified what that entails nor assessed 
each Petitioner’s ability to do so, and it undertook no 
consideration of the risk that Petitioners might spread COVID-
19 when released into the public. The notion that release 
lessens burdens on local healthcare resources requires a 
comparison of individual circumstances. Because nearly all 
Petitioners contended they have urgent and continuing health 
needs, the District Court should have considered burdens 
associated therewith on public healthcare resources. 
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In its April 10 decision, the Court stated it “respects the 
Respondents’ position that certain Petitioners pose a flight risk 
or danger to the community,” App. 19, and surmised that 
because of travel restrictions associated with COVID-19, 
including worldwide travel restrictions, the risk of absconding 
“is low,” App. 12. So the District Court treated Petitioners as 
if they all had the same low flight risk, and it did so without 
even considering whether any of them had a prior history of 
failing to appear or danger to the community. 
Moreover, the Court made no findings as to risks posed 
in light of each Petitioner’s criminal history. Instead, in its 
April 10 decision it stated to “allay some of the Respondents’ 
fears,” App. 20, it would include terms of release to “quell[]” 
concerns of flight risk and danger, App. 19. Petitioners’ 
individual criminal histories directly relate to the harm to the 
public by their release and the District Court’s failure to 
analyze those histories is especially problematic since many 
Petitioners were detained by congressional mandate or after an 
immigration judge had determined that detention was required 
to protect the public. Indeed, some of their criminal histories 
involve serious offenses, such as aggravated assaults, 
threatening sexual assault, first degree robbery, and weapons 
violations. 
Finally, the District Court erred in not considering as 
part of the balancing of harm practical difficulties involved in 
locating and re-detaining Petitioners should the Government 
ultimately prevail or should a Petitioner abscond, commit a 
crime, or violate another term of release. See Hope I, 956 F.3d 
at 162. 
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C 
The District Court also erred in fashioning relief. The 
Court too readily accepted the Petitioners’ all-or-nothing 
proposition that anything short of immediate release cannot 
remedy their plight.6 
Because it improperly elevated ideal social distancing 
to a constitutional standard, the District Court granted release 
without fully considering other options potentially available to 
it. Without a hearing and without considering the 
Government’s opposition under the appropriate standard, it’s 
no surprise that in addition to failing to consider the 
 
6 Petitioners rely on Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 521 
(2011), to justify release as the remedy for the asserted 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. But that case 
involved the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626, and a remedial injunction stipulated to by the state to 
address mental and medical care in overcrowded California 
prison populations. The PLRA includes release as a potential 
remedy to address unconstitutional prison conditions, but it 
does not apply to civil immigration detainees. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626(g)(3). And even if it did, Petitioners’ quest for 
immediate release would have been a non-starter because the 
statute mandates that relief for unconstitutional prison 
conditions (1) be “narrowly drawn;” (2) “extend no further 
than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires 
preliminary relief;” (3) be “the least intrusive means necessary 
to correct that harm;” and (4) include release only where a 
proper order was entered as to conditions, the respondent had 
a reasonable amount of time to comply with it, and compliance 
failed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) and (3). 
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Government’s increased social distancing and sanitation 
efforts at York and Pike in response to evolving circumstances, 
the Court failed to explore alternatives to avoid any irreparable 
harm to Petitioners.  
 The Petitioners’ quest for nothing short of release 
appeared to leave little room for a remedy short of the most 
extreme one. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 
(6th Cir. 2020) (habeas vehicle limits type of relief); O.M.G. v. 
Wolf, 2020 WL 4201635, at *8 (D.D.C. 2020) (immigration 
detainees seeking only “wholesale release” in light of risk of 
contracting COVID-19 by application for preliminary 
injunction not entitled to relief because they failed to show that 
nothing short of that relief can redress their injuries). In view 
of the legitimacy of mandatory and discretionary detention, 
even after a district court makes findings on the merits 
sufficient to support preliminary relief, it must carefully 
consider whether alternatives to release are appropriate before 
ordering release.  
As to the terms of Petitioners’ release, the Court did not 
explain why it rejected the Government’s alternative request 
that if the Court ordered release that it should also order that: 
the Detainees’ “counsel report each Petitioner’s whereabouts 
every 7 days;” they “be placed on home detention;” and they 
“wear ankle bracelets affixed by ICE.” App. 194 (emphasis 
added). The need for significant measures designed to ensure 
the Petitioners, once released, would not be “in the wind” 
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seems quite obvious,7 particularly with respect to those who 
had a history of failing to appear or of flight.  
True enough, the District Court’s April 10 order 
imposed some terms on the Petitioners’ release to “allay” fears 
and “quell” concerns, such as reiterating their legally mandated 
appearance at any removal hearings and adding that they report 
their whereabouts to their own attorneys. But its orders did not 
require any report to the Government, which would have 
provided some additional protection against risk of absconsion. 
Indeed, when asked at argument about the court-mandated 
weekly report by each Petitioner, their counsel admitted that 
Petitioners’ reporting obligation had not been regularized. See 
Oral Argument June 18, 2020 at 53:10–53:24. Finally, the 
Court did not explain its decision to release Petitioners on their 
own recognizance, instead of, at the very least, ordering home 
detention and monitoring by the Government.  
VIII 
 We acknowledge difficulties faced by trial courts in 
emergent matters and the need to act immediately, particularly 
during a pandemic. But exigent circumstances do not empower 
a court to jettison fundamental principles of due process or the 
rules of procedure that govern such matters. For the reasons we 
have explained, the District Court committed procedural and 
substantive errors that require us to vacate the April 7 and April 
10, 2020 orders and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
7 Some detainees released on their own recognizance in 
Thakker, 2020 WL 1671563, at *10, absconded. 
